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Background on 'Over-Banking'
The concept of 'over-banking' and its potentially destabilising effects has recently resurfaced in the economics literature. During the 1990s there was a rush of mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector, both within states and between states. This prompted a vigorous academic debate about the possible impact of consolidation in the banking system on banking stability and performance as well as a reconsideration of the appropriate regulatory and supervisory framework in which this consolidation should take place. 3 The consensus was that generally there were too many banks and that consolidation was likely to continue.
The 'mushrooming' of banks in transition economies in Eastern Europe in the 1990s generated a related literature assessing the extent of 'over-banking' and its implications. Bonin and Wachtel, for example, conclude that 'the proliferation of new banks creates more problems for the banking system than it solves' because poorly capitalised banks pursue excessively risky strategies that create systemic threats. 4 Pyle has argued that over-banking in Russia reduced the incentive of otherwise creditworthy borrowers to pay back their loans since reputation is not so important in an environment where there are a large number of alternative sources of bank loans. A large number of banks can obscure a borrower's credit history, since in the absence of a comprehensive credit reference agency it is easier to hide outstanding loans from other banks. 5 Petersen and Rajan show that highly competitive banking systems disrupt relationship-building that may be particularly important for SMEs' access to bank loans. 6 It seems that the existence of 'over-banking' is mainly only determined in hindsight. That is after a boom there follows a contraction in the number of banks and therefore a claim that the system had been 'overbanked'. 7 Another interpretation of this phenomenon, however, might be that the higher number of banks in period 1 was optimal to the market conditions of that period but that these changed, leading to a shedding of banks during period 2. Bonin has rather vaguely defined 'over-banking' in terms of the number of small banks and the number of banks per capita. 8 Jaffee and Levonian have tried to overcome the subjective judgement of what constitutes an appropriate banking structure. 9 They note that developed countries have a wide range of banking structures (e.g. assets/GDP, branches/GDP) that are influenced by a variety of economic and institutional factors. Using OECD data they calculate equations that explain the banking structure 26 developed countries and use these to provide a benchmark for transition economies in Eastern Europe to assess whether there are too many banks there. Their analysis, not surprisingly, suggests that size of GDP and the existence of an international financial centre are important determinants of the number of banks and the number of bank offices.
These approaches all suggest that there may be negative systemic results of an economy having 'too many' banks, and that these effects might be exaggerated in developing economies with a large number of SMEs (such as Hong Kong) although the threshold of what constitutes 'too many' banks is difficult to define and will be affected by the location of international banking centres (as exists in Hong Kong).
Conversely, consolidation will not necessarily have a negative impact on competitiveness or efficiency of the banking system. The case of Hong Kong will show that the political economy of how consolidation is achieved has important implications for the outcome.
2. What evidence is there that Hong Kong was 'over-banked' in the 1960s?
First we need to examine the bank data that is available. Banking statistics were not collected until the Association (EBA). However, it was not until March 1954 that the banks finally agreed to provide the data. 10 The EBA agreed to submit the data from June 1954, but insisted that it should not be published.
The HSBC was concerned about confidentiality even in consolidated accounts, given the relative size of HSBC, and the danger that if the information were public destabilising rumours might arise. 11 A little bit of knowledge was deemed to be a dangerous thing. This was not, however, a case of free banking since Hong Kong operated an effective currency board system under which the note issue was backed 100% by sterling assets. 17 Notes were issued by the note-issuing banks against the deposit of sterling in the Exchange Fund, which then issued 'certificates of indebtedness' that appeared in the asset side of the note-issuing banks' balance sheet. The notes themselves were not net liabilities of the note-issuing banks since they were issued on behalf of the Exchange Fund on which the note issuing banks had matching claims. The inclusion of the note issue swelled the total value of assets and liabilities considerably, with particularly important effects in the early years. When the data were analysed within the government, however, the note issue components were usually ignored. In summary, the note issue and matching assets arose from the absence of a central bank in Hong Kong and are not relevant to measurements of the extent of commercial banking activity in the colony, which is the basis of the claim that Hong Kong was 'over-banked'. 13 The dates the banks were included is in HKRS163-1-625.
14 Hang Seng's deposits increased from $60m to $82m from 1958-59. G Chambers, and early 1960s when note issue was large relative to deposits, as shown in Figure 1 .
The importance of the new definition of total assets is clearly apparent in the comparison shown in This downward adjustment has implications for the claim that Hong Kong was 'over-banked' in the 1960s because it reduces the relative size of bank business in the economy.
The adjusted level of banking activity is not high relative to OECD countries in the 1990s, most of which had ratios between 100-200%, except for hosts of IFCs where the ratio was much higher (400% for Switzerland, 4370% for Luxembourg). 19 By the mid 1960s Hong Kong had also emerged as a regional international financial centre and this must be borne in mind when assessing the demand and supply of banking services in the Colony. 20 There was a considerable (although not well quantified) inflow of deposits from overseas Chinese that came to comprise half of total bank deposits, according to some estimates. 21 The Financial Secretariat believed that most time deposits in the 1960s were from overseas. Figure 3 shows the acceleration in the rate of growth of deposits and total assets from 1954-1964. 22 The impact of the 1965 banking crisis was a redistribution of deposits rather than an overall decline. In 1967, however, there was a flight of capital out of the colony and an absolute reduction in bank deposits.
18 Jao calculated that bank assets were 99% of GDP by 1963 using published data and earlier GDP estimates. Looking at Hong Kong in a comparative perspective for the 1960s, we need to recognise that this decade was a period of considerable banking expansion globally. Table 1 below compares the growth rate of bank assets of Hong Kong with selected OECD countries. The data for other countries cover only their commercial banks to enhance comparability. 25 This shows the acceleration in the growth rate in Hong Kong, that it was considerably faster than elsewhere in the 1970s, and that it was comparable to that of Japan in the 1960s (during that country's period of high-speed growth). We would expect higher growth rates in Hong Kong, which started from a lower level than these more highly developed countries. 23 The unpublished data for the 1950s are in HKRS163-3-13. 24 After being in the doldrums in 1962 and 1963, the FEER share index rose from 116.4 in January 1964 to peak at 128.55 in December 1964. 25 Competition in Banking, OECD, 1989. Table 2 shows the number of bank offices per 100,000 population, which shows the increase in banking density in Hong Kong from its low level in 1960. In 1970, per capita GNP in Hong Kong was half of that of Japan but banking density in Hong Kong was less than one third that of Japan. 26 The table also shows a wide variety of ratios in Europe, Japan and the USA, although there was a general increase in banking density from 1960-1980. Table 3 shows the concentration of banking in Hong Kong in 1960 compared with other countries.
Again, this shows the wide range of banking structures internationally and that Hong Kong sits towards the middle of the group. 
Measuring Market Concentration
The relationship between market concentration and competitiveness is intuitively attractive. We might assume that a higher degree of concentration is associated with greater market power among a smaller group of banks and therefore a lower level of competitiveness of the market and higher abnormal profits.
However, the negative relationship has been shown not to be empirically (or even theoretically) reliable in the economics and industrial organisation literature. 27 High levels of concentration may still generate competitive markets. Nevertheless, market concentration is an important feature of assessing the nature of a banking system and helps to specify more precisely the situation historically in Hong Kong and compare it with more recent experience. The number of bank offices did grow considerably, but to put this into perspective the number of bank offices grew only slightly faster than GDP. 28 Within this average, however, there was considerable variation in size. Given the well-known dominance of the HSBC and Chartered Bank in both deposits and lending, the Hong Kong banking system might be expected to be highly consolidated even before the moratorium on new licenses. Figures 9 and 10 show the distribution of deposits and assets by cohort in 1964 and 1968. 29 The 10 or so banks with 1-2% market share lost position in terms of deposits between 1964 and 1968, but gained in terms of advances. The trend in deposits was toward the largest banks.
To give another perspective, Figure 11 shows the Lorenz curve for the market share of deposits and for Advances+Specified Liquid Assets in 1968. This is the broadest measure of total assets available for bank level data. The associated Gini coefficient for Advances+SLA is 0.756 in 1968 compared to 0.694
in 1964. The figure shows that market share for deposits was more concentrated than for Advances+SLA.
The most common measure of market concentration is the Hirfendahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which
gives particular weight to the largest market participants. It is calculated as:
where B = market share of bank i. of deposits compared to assets reflects the presence of international banks with higher local loan/ deposit ratios than local banks. 28 The surge in the average assets per license and the expansion of branch networks increased the franchise value of existing bank licenses, which further encouraged foreign take-overs. 29 The bank specific data come from HKRS163-1-3273, 3274, 3275, 3276. Their interpretation is that markets where the HHI is between 0.1 and 0.18 are 'moderately concentrated' and those above 0.18 are 'highly concentrated'. 31 Using this guideline, the Hong Kong banking system would fall into the low end of 'moderately concentrated'. Moreover, market concentration did not increase after the moratorium on new banking licenses in 1965. This index can also be compared with the HHI calculated for bank assets in 1994-2002, which showed a fall from .13 to .123 during this period, which was interpreted as indicative of an increasingly competitive environment. 32 The level of concentration for bank assets in the mid-1960s was considerably lower in the period 1964-72. The declining trend from 1968-72 suggests increased competitiveness of the market. Perversely, this analysis suggests that the moratorium was imposed at a time of heightened concentration due to the banking crisis of 1965, rather than at a time of increased competition which was the justification for its introduction.
Moreover, the moratorium does not appear to have increased concentration in the banking industry, suggesting that it may have protected the smaller banks disproportionately.
Profitability and Competitiveness
Measuring competitiveness is more difficult than measuring concentration. to publish data specific to their operations in Hong Kong. The quality of the information in the published balance sheets is also relatively poor with no disclosure of internal reserves or allocation for nonperforming loans. Profits were reported after transfer to inner reserves, which were included in Deposits and Other Accounts. Still, if we can assume a generally consistent approach to these transfers then we can measure change over time. 33 Net interest margins are available from data from the Census of Banks which began to be collected in 1980. 34 This data suggests that the banking system was increasingly competitive in this period since the NIM declined steadily from 1980-1987, during which period a series of bank fraud cases were exposed. Overhead costs fell in these years from about 1% to 0.4% of assets, suggesting an increase 0.5% to 0.2% and a fall in rental payments as a share of assets from 0.19% to 0.06% of assets due to a fall in the property market. 35 Data for the 1960s and 1970s is much scarcer and more patchy. Jao (1974) showed that, in common with elsewhere, small banks outperformed larger banks in terms of growth in deposits and profits from 1965-71, although they showed considerable variation. Assets and capital on average grew faster for large banks.
The trend in profitability for HSBC (including overseas branches) in Figure 15 shows why the bank was show a slower rate of growth than for the banks as a whole. Given that the banks excluded from the sample tend to be smaller, the gap between the rates of profit of large and small banks is likely to have been even higher.
Interest Rate Spread
Another way to get at the competitiveness of the market is looking at the spread between lending and deposit rates. A declining spread is evidence of an increasingly competitive market. In 1994 the Consumer Council claimed that the IRR generated monopsony profits for banks based on the interest rate spread for 1978-91. They calculated that Hong Kong's BLR-Fixed Deposit spread was 1.65% higher on average than other countries. 37
The data for the 1960s are patchy but the trend shows a general increase in the lending spread (calculated as the best lending rate less the weighted deposit rate), from about 1% in the third quarter of 1961 to 2% when the IRA was introduced and then rising above 3% in the later 1960s. This suggests that the 35 S Kwan found that total operating costs averaged 1.2% of assets for Hong Kong's commercial banks in 1999. market was becoming less competitive, which rather contradicts the contemporary testimony of the banks that complained about excessive competition. 38 The margins for small banks may have been lower than the margins for the larger authorised banks, but the evidence is patchy. In 1964, before the IRA was imposed, it was reported that smaller banks offered 1/2-2% more for deposits and charged 1-6% more on loans. 39 The IRA was introduced in response to an 'interest rate war' with reported deposit rates as high as 10% for 12-month deposits and 6% for 7-day deposits during early 1964. 40 After the moratorium was introduced, Figure 18 shows that the lending spread was remarkably stable during most of the 1970s at about 3% for Best Lending Rate and 4.5-5% for SMR by the 1970s. 41 Margins then increased during the volatile interest rate period of the 1980s before stabilising at a slightly higher level towards the end of the decade.
In the 1960s the BLR was set jointly by the Chartered Bank and the HSBC and it then applied to all members of the Exchange Banks Association (39 in 1964). 42 The 3-month deposit rate tended to follow changes in British Bank Rate, remaining slightly above LIBOR and slightly below the US 3-month rate.
The rate offered for savings deposits was determined by tax law, which set the tax-free limit of 3% until July 1968 and 3.5% thereafter. Time deposit rates were not controlled until the IRA was enforced in July 1964. In the early 1960s, before the IRA was introduced, the HSBC and Chartered Bank did try to exercise control over deposit rates. The rise in UK Bank rate from 5% to 7% in 1961 set off increases in rates by foreign banks that led to increased competition for local banks, who in turn raised their rates. In September-November 1961 the EBA and some large non-authorised banks engaged in discussions to set a sliding scale of interest rate ceilings for deposits, but the agreement was not effective. 43 The main obstacle was that members could not agree on the overall range (non-member banks wanted a wider range of 1 1/2% as opposed to 1% Not all banks were satisfied by the IRA structure and they sought to move outside it. This suggests that some banks (in particular the HSBC who pushed the scheme on other reluctant banks) benefited at the expense of others. The B2 category was eliminated after three European banks threatened to withdraw in July 1965. Some large local banks were moved to a 'Special Category' in March 1966 to bring them into closer competition with foreign banks.
JJ Cowperthwaite was a critic of the IRA in the 1960s, and his successor Haddon-Cave, was also critical of the generous margins that the commercial banks operated in the early 1970s. 46 By 1980, however, the financial secretary was a strong supporter of the IRA. The main reason he gave was that it protected small banks from competition. 47 The implication is that the large banks would otherwise charge higher interest rates that the smaller banks could not afford to pay. In 1964, however, the goal was to prevent the large banks from having to offer the same high rates as the smaller banks and to ensure that the smaller banks followed the rates set by the Exchange Banks Association. The IRA also Committee after winding up their business. Others, however, went bankrupt leaving dishonoured debts to depositors sometimes leading to public runs on the banks, but not leading to systemic contagion. 49 If there was a time of 'over-banking' it was arguably the 1950s when there were 133 banks rather than the 1960s when there were 74.
Another argument against the claim that small bank failures threatened systemic stability is that the failure of small banks did not always spark off a banking crisis. One case in the early 1960s (between the two banking crises, when it must be assumed that public confidence was fragile) was Chiu Tai Bank, The danger of a run on the Chiu Tai Bank was considered unlikely by Sorby since most deposits were from family members of the owner, or from close associates. In these circumstances protection of the public was not considered a reason to take action to suspend the bank's license even after the bank admitted that it was insolvent and after the first few large cheques were dishonoured at the beginning of reported in the newspapers, further undermining the reputation of the bank but no run occurred, and there was no systemic contagion. The incompetent or perhaps fraudulent operation of a small bank was not sufficient to cause systemic problems.
Using archive data for the 1965 crisis it is clear that there is no correlation between size of deposits in December 1964 (a month before the second bank crisis) and the proportional fall in deposits during January and February. Figure 19 plots the relationship, leaving out HSBC to enhance the scale (HSBC's deposits were $2.2b at the end of 1964 and increased by 8% during this period). The correlation coefficient for size of deposits at the end of 1964 and liquidity ratio at the end of February 1965 is -0.04.
There is a slightly higher correlation for local banks (other than HSBC) between size of deposits and change in deposits during the first round of the crisis but it is still low at -0.18 (compared to 0.06 for the banking system as a whole). Table 7 shows that it was the banks with 1-2% of total deposits that suffered more than smaller banks on average during both waves of the crisis (in January/February and April 1965).
In the case of Hong Kong, the prevalence of family ownership or sole proprietorship of small banks could reduce incentives to engage in excessively risky behaviour since the reputation and also assets of the family/founding individual were at stake. For a public bank, in contrast, the burden of failure would be spread to shareholders and depositors. On the other hand, private family ownership increased the opportunity for poor management and fraudulent activity, which could be exaggerated when the family controlled a group of inter-linked companies as was often the case in Hong Kong.
Looking more closely at the causes of the bank crises in the 1960s shows that they did not stem from excessive competition, but rather from the complexity of inter-locking business groups that encouraged insider lending and reduced the liquidity of assets. This was not directly or exclusively linked to an excessively competitive environment. Liu Chong Hing Bank, which was at the heart of the 1961 crisis, had paid up capital of $10m (twice the amount recommended in the subsequent Banking Ordinance) and was by no means considered a 'small' bank. Other Liu Chong Hing businesses included construction, property development, warehouses and an insurance company, all owned by Liu Po-shan and his eight sons and all vulnerable to property market shocks. Despite this evidence, HSBC and Chartered Bank took the opportunity to lobby the Financial Secretary for anti-competitive regulation, arguing that there were too many banks in Hong Kong and that this excessive competition was undermining the stability of the system as a whole. They asserted that because small banks offered higher interest rates in their search for deposits, this forced them into risky higher nominal return investments that were often illiquid. 57 Oliphant, deputy manager of the HSBC, himself drew up a draft banking ordinance that required the government to constrain competition in banking by regulating opening hours, interest rates and lending policy. 58 The inclusion of opening hours suggests that there was a strong anti-competitive edge to his approach rather than merely concern for systemic stability. 61 The bank's assets were able to be liquidated after a $10m loan from the government allowed the completion of construction on various properties. The Official Receiver was also helped by the recovery of the property market in the early 1970s.
A run on the Aberdeen branch drained its liquidity on the eve of Chinese New Year when the demand for cash was traditionally high. The HSBC met with Canton Trust over the New Year holiday and agreed to lend HK$25m, but believed that the general crisis was caused by 'Government reluctance to take firm action in the case of Liu Chong Hing or to limit the number of banks'. 62 In the end Canton Trust could not be saved and it closed its doors on 8 February.
The other major casualty of the 1965 crisis was the Hang Seng Bank, the second largest bank in Hong
Kong measured by deposits. Like Liu Chong Hing and Ming Tak, Hang Seng Bank was part of a network of companies engaged in a wide range of businesses. The holding company, Hang Chong Investment
Co. Ltd., owned a property investment company, a trading company, and a taxi company as well as
Hang Seng Bank. 63 The directors of Hang Chong Investment Co. Ltd. also had interests in Macao, the Miramar Hotel and hydrofoils. 64 In its analysis of the causes of Hang Seng's difficulties, the HSBC concluded that illiquid loans to group companies and heavy exposure to the property market were the main factors in Hang Seng's vulnerability. 65 In none of these cases was the failure caused by the bank offering excessively high interest for deposits nor by excessive competition prompting risky behaviour. This section has argued that the threat to banking in Hong Kong was not the number of banks or their size, but the interlocking ownership of banks and other businesses that were prone to asset market shocks, combined with poor governance.
Neither source of weakness was going to be directly affected by anti-competitive regulation. The moratorium on new licenses might encourage foreign takeovers of local banks that would enhance governance, but only when families were willing to relinquish control. This aspect will be addressed in a later paper.
7. Conclusions: Was Hong Kong 'over-banked'?
The history of the Hong Kong banking system has been seriously undermined by the lack of data. The published data are inconsistent, too generalised, and begin relatively late. This paper has reconstructed data from archival sources to add to the length of period, recalculated the data to increase consistency, and presented bank-specific data from official and private archives. This allows a more textured view of the structure of the banking system during the critical years of the 1960s when the regulatory framework for Hong Kong's banking system for the next 36 years was set.
The claims that Hong Kong was 'over-banked' can only be substantiated if market entry reduced the profits of existing banks to the extent of threatening bank solvency, or if the competition among banks led to higher risk in lending due to competition for sound outlets for loans. Both were claimed for Hong Kong in the 1960s. There is no evidence of an overall fall in profits before 1964-65, but certainly there is evidence of an increase in profits after the moratorium was introduced. The interest rate spread also suggests that the competitiveness of the market was decreasing even before the 1964 interest rate agreement was introduced, and that this trend continued afterward. In terms of market concentration, the evidence is incomplete, but it does seem to have been lower in the 1960s than in the 1990s. After the moratorium on new licenses in 1965 the market likely became less concentrated as HSBCs market share declined.
Examining the causes of the bank failures of the 1960s that triggered the anti-competitive regulation shows that the problem was not the size of the banks or excessive competition. In each case the bank was linked through family and group networks to other companies that were vulnerable to asset market shocks, in particular property. These banks engaged in insider lending within their group that ultimately threatened their liquidity and solvency. The solution to this problem was increased prudential supervision and enforcement, not reduction in competition.
In terms of the ex post identification of over-banking it is difficult to make the case for Hong Kong. After the moratorium, there were several applications for further licences that were turned down, mainly from foreign banks wanting to enter the market. Moreover there was no subsequent phenomenon of consolidation or bank closure as has been used to identify over-banking in Europe -rather the reverse.
The number of licensed banks was remarkably stable throughout the moratorium. On the other hand, in the 1970s there was a dramatic increase in deposit taking companies, suggesting that there was still considerable scope in the market at the profitable wholesale end at least. These are not the conditions in which we would identify over-banking in the 1960s.
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